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There is a considerable  amount of literature about Amartya Sen’s capability 
approach. Since, as Sen himself and many theoreticians have stated, the capability 
approach is incomplete (Sen 1993),  many scholars have analysed, improved or 
expanded this approach within different dimensions. Some scholars have examined 
and extended the capability approach under traditions such as Smithian, Marxist, 
Hegelian, Kantian, Aristotelian or Spinozan, others have analysed the central points 
of this approach (such as freedom, universality, capability), while still others have 
discussed its methodological, epistemelogical or ontological aspects. These 
numerous studies indicate a growing concern about whether Sen’s capability 
approach can be evaluated within mainstream economics and/or whether Sen himself 
can be consiredered as a mainstream scholar. Actually there exists no single defini-
tion of mainstream economics. Although Sen has spoken of himself as a “main-
stream” economist, he has added that, for him, mainstream economics is in the tradi-
tion of Robinson, Marx, Kaldor and so forth. For Ingrid Robeyns (2002, p. 2), when 
Sen calls himself a mainstream economist, he is trying to rescue economics from the 
narrow-minded, imperialist discipline that it has become. On the other hand, it could 
also be claimed that all of these traditions which are labeled as mainstream by Sen 
have a common character; they are methodologically and ontologically based on the 
modernist paradigm. 86  Hatice Karaçay Çakmak 
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As stated above, there is no consensus about whether Sen is a mainstream 
economist or not. Roughly, and setting aside nuances and inconsistencies over what 
he should or should not have got it for, there are two classifications. While some 
social scientists (Ben Fine 2001; Toru Yamamori 2003; Robeyns 2002, 2003) claim 
that Sen really goes beyond mainstream approach, others (Bharat Jhunjhunwalla 
2000; Emmanuelle Benicourt 2002; Bernard Guerrian 2002) argue that there is no 
important difference between mainstream economics and the capability approach. 
For example, Fine (2001) emphasized that there are several important signs which 
indicate that Sen cannot be placed in the mainstream. The journey from Social 
Choice to Development as Freedom is long, complex and non-mainstream. It in-
volves the incorporation of new themes – to formal ethics are added inequality, fam-
ine, capabilities and freedom (Fine 2001, p. 4). Similarly Robeyns (2002) claims that 
Sen has written scores of articles that are definitely non-mainstream. According to 
her, a firm distinction should be made between an economist who is a traditional 
mainstream economist, and those who, including Sen, use neoclassical mainstream 
tools from time to time. 
On the other hand, as stated above, some scholars are definitely assert that Sen 
could not go beyond mainstream paradigm. For example, Guerrian (2002) says that 
Sen, as an economist, is a standard micro economist; only the vocabulary that he uses 
(capabilities, functionings, etc.) is different. Or, Benicourt (2002) argues that when 
Sen explicitly describes his system (particularly in Commodities and Capabilities 
1985b), it becomes clear that it is just a variation of the mainstream economic theory. 
According to Benicourt, instead of reasoning in terms of an n-dimensional space 
composed of “commodities“, Sen proposes a space of “functionings“. Similarly, 
Jhunjhunwalla (2000), who also appreciates Sen as a mainstream economist, strongly 
suggests that the capability approach cannot make a difference with western main-
stream economic analysis. He claims that Sen’s thinking is ahistorical. Because Sen’s 
vision is that of a healthy, educated and perpetually poor people of the developing 
countries slogging for the MNCs of the West. He has also added that Sen is a well 
meaning person who was deeply moved by deprivation that he saw in his early years, 
but Sen has gone astray in bad company. Thus, he cannot be excused (Jhunjhunwalla 
2000, p. 13). 
There are also some important facts to justify why Sen and his analyses have 
been introduced within the context of mainstream economics. Firstly, since the 
1990s, the term “human development“ has frequently been used by (neo-) liberal 
international institutions (i.e. IBRD, UNDP and so on). Sen’s capability approach 
gained importance when the central concepts and policy implications of his approach 
were taken into account in various reports: World Development Reports, Human 
Development Reports or even the IFSs. Secondly, over two decades, in studies done 
by many scholars, the capability approach has been recently associated with Martha 
Nussbaum, a famous liberal feminist writer. Stating that the neo-Aristotelian 
extension of the capability approach developed by Nussbaum (1992) has remained 
faithful to the original, Sen (1993) gets himself closer to a liberal discourse.  
Before analysing whether the capability approach can be evaluated within the 
frame of mainstream economics or not, the meaning of the study should be clearly 87  Can the Capability Approach be Evaluated within the Frame of Mainstream Economics? A Methodological Analysis 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2010, 1, pp. 85-99
stated. In other words, the importance of the issue and the appropriateness of the 
approach for the liberal or another discourse should be clearly manifested. There are 
several factors which explain the importance of the issue. Firstly, as stated before, the 
capability approach has been heavily linked first to Aristotle and then to Libertarian-
ism, but it also has been referred to Marx and recently to Kant. This provides re-
searchers with the opportunity (or the disadvantage) to take a focused view on the 
methodological/epistemological possibilities (or limitations) of thoughts. On the 
other hand, to engage in any thought burdens a certain set of philosophical/ methodo-
logical/ epistemological ground, some or all of which might enter the analysis: what 
factors should be selected for the evaluation of freedom; how can we measure basic 
needs; how can we appreciate happiness; what is the origin of “good“; what kind of 
reasoning explain the real world; what is the crucial role of mathematics in under-
standing social life, and so on.  
Thirdly and more importantly, the methodological/epistemological back-
ground of the approach will have important extensions relating to its prospective ap-
plications. For example, when someone advocates a view about ecosystems, local 
institutions, human rights, gender issues, vulnerability, minority rights, or other con-
siderations, his/her stance on this issue will be determined by the methodological and 
epistemological background of the approach.  
Hence, to evaluate the prospective applications of the capability approach by 
considering their backgrounds and to evaluate their limits and/or possibilities, the 
epistemological/methodological grounds of the approach need to be analyzed.  
 Parallel with these stances, the aim of this article is to examine the capability 
approach and mainstream economics in terms of their epistemological, 
methodological and philosophical/cultural aspects. The main argument of the study is 
that Sen’s capability approach, contrary to what some economists’ claim, is 
uncongenial to mainstream economic views on epistemology and methodology (not 
on ontologically). To this end, we analyze the main methodological/philosophical 
differences between CA and mainstream economics under several headings such as 
formalism, reductionism or universalism. But before that, we first examine the 
general framework of Sen’s capability approach. 
 
1. General Framework of Sen’s Capability Approach 
 
Sen’s capability approach has often been criticized as being “too indefinite” or 
“insufficiently specified”. The scope of the capability approach has been improved 
and expanded even in Sen’s own studies. By re-examining these studies and his own 
studies, Sen more systematically expanded some points of his own approach in the 
light of these studies.  
Sen proposed his capability approach as an alternative to standard liberal 
utilitarian approaches that focus on resources, per capita income or Rawlsian social 
primary goods. The main aim of his earlier studies was to show that social scientists 
cannot explain “development” within the framework of quantitative indicators only. 
He argued that, in order to realize development, people’s capabilities should be 
focused on. To discuss people’s capabilities and hence to explain the development 88  Hatice Karaçay Çakmak 
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process, one has to take normative evaluations into account (inequality, capability, 
happiness, poverty, democracy, political participation, etc.).  
  Since Sen essentially emphasizes the importance of normative evaluations, 
he proposes ethical prescriptions of the development process. Although, especially 
after the 1990’s, Sen himself expanded and more systematically explained his 
approach from different dimensions and also emphasized the ontological description 
of his concepts within these studies (eg. what is meant by freedom or what is meant 
by capability), the main reason of these efforts is also to emphasize the importance of 
ethical evaluations. Hence, it could be easily stated that although Sen aims to portray 
the ontological descriptions of his own concepts to eliminate any complexity in his 
approach, he always focuses on the ethical prescriptions of the development process 
in all his studies. Sen’s core argument is that while within the standard liberal 
utilitarian approaches the focuse is on utilitarian evaluation, his own approach also 
focuses on normative evaluations. In other words, in explaining the development 
process, the focus should be on human capabilities that show what people are able to 
be and do, not on what they can purchase, gain or consume.  
Sen has been against an utility-based evaluation of individual well-being, 
because such an evaluation might hide important dimensions of development process 
and also lead to misleading interpersonal or intertemporal comparisons. For him, an 
utilitarian evaluation will only assess his/her satisfaction and will not differentiate 
between a happy and well-conditioned person and an equally happy, but unhealthy 
and badly conditioned person who has mentally adapted to his/her situation.  
From a parallel point of view, the core argument of the capability approach is 
that the concepts of well-being and capability are two completely distinct concepts 
and well-being is not important in itself in explaining development, but what is 
important is “capability”. Capabilities reflect the alternative combinations of 
“functionings” that are feasible for a person to achieve. Functionings are “beings and 
doings” such as being sheltered, being educated or receiving necessary nutrition. 
Functionings also involve more sophisticated activities such as being able to take part 
in community life and having self-respect. Sen also describes the “capability set” in 
terms of functionings. He defines “capability set” as a mathematical set of alternative 
functioning vectors a person can choose from. In all his studies (especially the latter 
ones), he emphasizes potential functionings, instead of actual functioning. Briefly, 
Sen distinguishes between commodities, human functioning/capability and utility as 
follows (David Clark 2007, p. 2): Commodity → Capability (to function) → 
Functioning → Utility (e.g. happiness). 
The framework of Sen’s analysis is based on three key concepts. Freedom is 
the other important concept, in addition to “capability” and “functioning”. The 
concept of “freedom” is closely related with the concept of “capability”. In order to 
explain the link between these two concepts, the concept of “capability” has to be 
explained in a more detail. Capability refers to a situation in which the individual is 
able to use her/his possibilities and her/his power to the degree and in the ways s/he 
chooses (Sen 1993, p. 31). These capabilities are classified as; (1) obtaining welfare, 
(2) obtaining other aims other than welfare, (3) freedom of welfare, (4) freedom of 
pursuing aims other than welfare. According to Sen’s capability approach, the 89  Can the Capability Approach be Evaluated within the Frame of Mainstream Economics? A Methodological Analysis 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2010, 1, pp. 85-99
individual’s set of capabilities needs to be considered not as the actualized aims 
shown in items (1) and (2), but mainly as a choice between the opportunities shown 
in items (3) and (4) (Wulf Gaertner 1993, p. 64). Hence, Sen himself consistently 
regards the concept of freedom as the other central concept in his analyses. In fact, 
this concept typically replaces “capability” in his 1999 book Development as 
Freedom.  
Sen (1999) notes that freedom should be viewed as both “the primary end” 
and the “principal means” of development. Although Sen deals with freedom as the 
central category of his analysis, he criticizes the usage of a purely negative 
conception of freedom within a wider critique of mainstream economics. He 
emphasizes positive freedom to mean the ability to attain desired ends. Sen stated: “I 
have found it more useful to see ‘positive freedom’ as the person’s ability to do the 
things in question taking everything into account (including external restraints as 
well as internal limitations)” (Sen 2002, p. 586).  
Sen (1999) points out five instruments of human development:  
 
  Political freedoms: opportunities for political participation and dissent; 
  Economic facilities: opportunities that individuals have to use economic 
resources for the purpose of consumption, production or exchange. This 
includes the availability of, and access to, finance; 
  Social opportunities: the arrangements that society makes for health care 
and education, which influence people’s ability to live better. These are 
important for an individual to be a more effective participant in economic 
activities as well as for a person’s own life; 
  Transparency guarantees: involve the freedom to deal with one another 
under certainties of disclosure and lucidity. They have definite role in 
preventing corruption, financial irresponsibility and fraudulent activity; 
  Protective Security: the need to provide a social safety net when vulnerable 
people suffer adverse circumstances. 
 
Sen argues that development must be seen within the context of the complex 
interconnections between these five instrumental freedoms (Sen 1999, p. 38). 
However, Sen emphasizes the importance of political, economic and social 
opportunities over transparency guarantees and protective security. This emphasis on 
opportunities displays the importance of capacities and capabilities as potentials, 
rather than actualization in Sen’s capability approach. 
 
2. The Basic Roots of the Capability Approach 
 
As discussed above, Sen’s capability approach presents a completely different 
structure than what the mainstream economics do. The main reason of this stance is 
that capability approach is based on a substantially different methodologi-
cal/epistemological ground with respect to the mainstream economics. The main aim 
of the study is to show that capability approach and mainstream economics are 
incompatible in terms of the methodological/cultural roots suggested in the first 
section. To this aim, we would like to analyze methodological/cultural roots of the 
capability approach and to compare it with mainstream economics. 90  Hatice Karaçay Çakmak 
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2.1 A Specific Mathematical Method (Formalism)  
 
Mainstream economics usually positions itself clearly in the Cartesian camp and 
Newtonian world which is extremely mechanical. The focus of modern economics is 
directed at the technical assumption which needs mathematical modelings and 
standard calculus. The soul of modern mainstream economics is an insistence on 
methods of mathematical-deductivist modelling. Mark Blaug (1997) expresses that 
modern economics is sick; because it has increasingly become an intellectual game 
played -namely social mathematics- for its own sake and not for its practical 
consequences for understanding the economic world.  
The rise of positivism during the first half of the twentieth century, together 
with the great success of natural sciences where mathematical methods were exten-
sively employed led to the formalist belief that the use of mathematical methods is 
not just useful, but actually essential for economics to become a scientific discipline. 
In other words, according to formalism, mathematical expression or models based on 
deductivism should not just be used as an instrument, but also as a specific philoso-
phy of mathematics. In this context, the economic background of the models has be-
come secondary. It means that the same models could be used to explain different 
phenomena other than economic ones. 
According to Sen, the belief that mathematical methods are essential for eco-
nomics to become a scientific discipline must be carefully scrutinized. Sen has 
clearly proposed that this kind of reasoning is not appropriate for solving the 
complexity of socio-economic phenomena. For him, it is certainly arguable that the 
language of standard mathematical expression is often not rich enough to capture 
many subtleties that call for informal understanding. The formal expressions of 
which, if possible, would be extraordinarily unhelpful, long, and complex (Sen 1984, 
p. 65). 
He has also stated that the belief that mathematical expressions must be more 
precise in capturing what we wish to say can be badly mistaken, since subtleties may 
be eschewed in choosing particular formal statements. Indeed, the precise expression 
of a complicated truth cannot possibly take a simple form, however precise-looking 
the simple formula might be. A formal expression can be extremely precise without 
being at all a precise representation of the underlying concept to be captured (Sen 
2004, p. 597). 
On the other hand, it is not true to say that, he is definitely against using 
mathematical formalizations in economics. Actually Sen aims to emphasize that 
formal reasoning should be used with greater discrimination. He clearly states that 
the real issue does not concern doubts about the positive contributions of quantita-
tive/empirical analysis, but relates to worries about the negative effects that 
overconcentration on standard mathematical methods often tends to produce (Sen 
2004, p. 599). 
 
2.2 The Method of Equilibrium 
 
Economic equilibrium is simply a state of the world where economic forces are bal-
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variables will not change. Equilibrium analyses in mainstream economics have been 
established through the process of the injunction of Newtonian mechanics to eco-
nomic theory (Philip Mirowski 1984). For the law of Newtonian mechanics which 
introduces a cause-effect relation, within a given set, one can definitely calculate and 
know the result of the forces that affect each other. Mainstream economists advocate 
that equilibrium analyses in economics are helpful in understanding market structure 
and these exercises in pure theory ultimately have much practical relevance.  
On the other hand, many economists, including Sen, have argued that not only 
is the nature of contemporary capitalism very different from what we see in models 
of competitive general equilibrium, but also that the most momentous features of 
modern capitalism are largely lost in these models. 
Sen strongly argues that equilibrium analyses of economics need several dif-
ferent and difficult/unrealistic requirements (Sen 2004, p. 591). For example, as 
given constraints faced by him/her, each agent should be in a maximized position or 
there should be no excess demand and supply in the market or equilibrium is sponta-
neously reached and so on. 
Sen states that the concept of equilibrium has an important reductionist role 
and it makes it possible to deal with complexities of human behavior and of interde-
pendences in markets in a relatively simple way. On the other hand, he also explicitly 
says that the reductionist role of equilibrium analyses and its contribution to tractabil-
ity are highly prized in economic theory. According to him, there is no doubt that 
equilibrium analysis has contributed both tractability and elegance to a good deal of 
economic reasoning. But these achievements have been purchased at a high price of 
remoteness from descriptive reality or predictive efficiency (Sen 2004, p. 591). 
The other problem about equilibrium analyses –which also be stated by Sen- is 
that there are different important questions regarding equilibrium, in particular (1) 
existence, (2) uniqueness, (3)stability, and (4) efficiency. According to him, it is pos-
sible for equilibrium to exist, and even be unique, but nevertheless be unstable, so 
that departures from it may not be corrected, and it could not be assumed that irre-
spective of initial conditions the economy will move to such equilibrium. And also, 
an equilibrium could exist, be unique and stable; but be economically inefficient in 
the sense of not achieving Pareto optimality (Sen 2004, p. 592). 
 
2.3 Methodological Individualism 
 
Methodological individualism is the philosophical position that social phenomena are 
to be accounted for in terms of the actions of individuals. Social institutions and 
social development should be understood as no more than the aggregation of 
individuals and their dispositions. The emphasis on the individual in the analysis of 
socio-economic phenomena becomes prominent with the Enlightenment, and it is 
found in the works of numerous authors, including Locke and Bentham (Geoffrey 
Hodgson 2007, p. 211). In other words, the origin of this methodological principle 
dates back to the last quarter of the 17th century. But the term “methodological 
individualism” was invented by a leading economist. Joseph A. Schumpeter (1909) 
distilled some of the ideas in his 1908 text into an article published in the Quarterly 
Journal of Economics. It is here that the term “methodological individualism” first 92  Hatice Karaçay Çakmak 
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appears in an academic work in English (Hodgson 2007, p. 212). When Schumpeter 
introduced the term “methodological individualism” in 1908, he was doing so as a 
student of Max Weber. Actually Weber (1968) promoted this doctrine as a 
methodological precept for the social sciences in the first chapter of Economy and 
Society, published after his death in 1920.  
Methodological individualism has been also explained and called in different 
terms. For example, Bhargava’s definition for this term is “all social phenomena are 
to be explained wholly and exclusively in terms of individuals and their properties” 
(Rajeev Bhargava 1992, p. 19). Or, from a critical realist perspective, Bhaskar calls it 
social atomism, in which the explanation of social events is deduced from the 
behavior of the participating individuals and the description of their situation (Roy 
Bhaskar 1998, p. 28).  
The essential impetus behind the creation of mainstream economics is 
Newtonian atomism and also methodological individualism. According to Newtonian 
model of economic life, the workings of an economy as a whole can be “reduced” to 
a simple sum of the actions of each individual participant who aims to pursue self-
interests. The predecessor of this methodology in economics is Adam Smith. By 
moving the science of economics from the methodological holism of mercantilism to 
methodological individualism, though he has never used the term “methodological 
individualism”, Smith made himself central to the use of this term in the science of 
economics. The atomistic reductionism of Newtonian classical mechanism basically 
determines the essence of neoclassical economics, rather than classical economics. 
According to Christian Arnsperger and Yanis Varoufakis (2006), it is indisputable 
that all the new manifestations of neoclassicism still subscribe to methodological 
individualism. While it is true that mainstream economists have, during the last few 
decades, acknowledged that the agent is a creature of her social context, and thus that 
social structure and individual agency are messily intertwined, their models retain the 
distinction and place the burden of explanation on the individual. 
On the other hand, it is also arguable to claim that Smith and other classsical 
or neoclassical economists advocate methodological individualism. Many scholars 
consider that the individualism of classical economics was more political and 
economical than theoretical and methodological (Lars Udéhn 2001, p. 6).  
If we term individualism as the situation in which the individual cannot be 
subjected to a higher authority, we would say that Sen’s capability approach is “too 
individualistic”. However, we know that there are different concepts of 
individualism. If we trace this term in an ethical or normative manner, we would 
again say that Sen’s capability approach is “too individualistic”. Hence, in order to 
analyse “individualism of the capability approach”, we should distinguish between 
the definitions of ethical, methodological, and ontological individualism. Ethical 
individualism makes a claim about who or what should ultimately count in our 
evaluative exercises and decisions (Robeyns 2005, p. 101). It postulates that 
individuals, and only individuals, are the ultimate units of moral concern. According 
to this description, Sen essentially deals with ethical individualism, since he 
evaluates the concept of development as a “human being’s development”, not as 
“development for human beings”, or since he evaluates economic policies in terms of 
their effect on the individual’s capability set. 93  Can the Capability Approach be Evaluated within the Frame of Mainstream Economics? A Methodological Analysis 
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It should be also noted that Sen has obviously considered the limitations of 
“autonomy, agency and individualism”. In order to reveal the effects of dominant 
customs, beliefs and modes of living which also cause for example unjust constraints 
on their activity, Sen introduces the term “critical voice”: 
 
“… an adequate realisation of women’s agency relates not only to the fredoom to act but 
also to the freedom to question and reassess. Critical agency is a great ally of 
development” (Sen 2002, p. 274). 
 
2.4 The Mechanics of Self-interest and Utility 
 
Behind the mechanics of self-interest and utility, there are two important hegemonic 
powers. While the idea of “methodological individualism” established the 
methodological framework of mainstream economics, liberal political theory formed 
the political culture of this economics, which could justify market enlargement and 
excessive consumption of capitalist system. According to the majority of classical 
liberal philosophers, human nature includes greedy, selfish, possessive, aggressive 
individualistic elements. Alongside these assumptions, the utilitarian approach of 
classical liberal philosophy states that the individual pursues his own interests and 
aims to maximise his individual utility.  
Two different definitions of rationality are used in economics: internal 
consistency of choice and maximization of self-interest. Internal consistency of 
choice may be necessary for rationality, as we could consistently act to achieve 
exactly the opposite of what we want to achieve. Sen (2002) argues that although it 
may be feasible to assume that people always maximize their self-interest, the 
suggestion that any behavior other than the maximization of self-interest is irrational, 
as it implies a rejection of the role of ethics in decision-making. Since economic 
behavior may rely on culture, religion, country, sex, age and so forth, and may have a 
strong ethical dimension, Sen criticized to classify self-interest as the only 
motivation, rather than one of many motivations. Therefore, Sen suggests that the 
definition of rationality is ideal as neither internal consistency of choice nor as the 
maximization of self-interest.  
Sen states that the concept of utility as a measurement of well-being is too 
narrow. Although it can reflect well-being, this may be insufficient, and furthermore 
well-being may be better described as something other than utility. Sen states that 
“there are different interpretations of utility, in particular (1) happiness, (2) desire 
fulfillment (3) choice” (Sen 1985a, p. 187). Sen criticized all three types of 
utilitarianism and also social choice theories (such as those of Buchanan and Arrow) 
in his studies. We can give an example of his criticism as follows: 
 
“ …in arriving at social choice solutions of diverse views on systematic process concern, 
preferences cannot do all the work. In particular, rules of aggregation are processes too, 
and they are needed to do the social choice exercise of combining diverse views. Rules that 
fix the constituent features of the overall arrangement for aggregation are sometimes called 
‘the constitution’ in terms of which individual preferences are put together to arrive at a 
social choice. For example, in the Arrovian system, rules such as the independence of 
irrelevant alternatives and the Pareto principle are not themselves put to a vote. In fact, if 
these rules themselves were to be determined by a ‘prior’ voting mechanism or some other 
social choice process, there would then be a need to have other rules governing the choice 94  Hatice Karaçay Çakmak 
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of these ‘prior’ social choice mechanisms. At some stage, some rules would have to come 
from outside the immediate domain of individual preferences.” (Sen 2002, p. 626). 
 
2.5 Universalism and Uniformity of Human Nature 
 
Universalism is reason and science producing general principles and laws which can 
be applied to all situations everywhere. On the other hand, uniformity of human 
nature is the concept that the principal characteristics of humans are always and 
everywhere the same.  
At this point, it has become more crucial to examine the stance of mainstream 
economics on human needs and rights, and also on universalism. It has adopted a 
Euro-centric universalist viewpoint, which means that in the process of development 
there is an absolute and universal path, valid for all societies and economies; and that 
due to this, “development” cannot differ among societies and cultures. Parallel to this 
view, human needs show an absolute and universal path, valid for all human beings. 
This viewpoint ignores the fact that people could perceive development differently 
according to their identities (gender, religion, ethnic identities etc.) or to the 
communities to which they feel they belong. In other words, in the Euro-centric 
viewpoint of universalism, an attitude which is closed to the difference of human 
existence and hence to its incomparability is displayed. 
While his theory can be situated within universalism, Sen criticizes any form 
of rough universalism which does not consider the difference between and among 
cultures. Sen also criticizes cultural relativist forms of communitarian or post-
modern ethics which treat each culture as sacrosanct and beyond criticism. This 
stance presupposes that each culture has completely different structures and has to be 
isolated from others. In this way, by avoiding tracing development ethics within two 
extreme approaches, Sen seeks universal ethical discourse with cultural relativity 
within their local traditions and local choices (Des Gasper 1996, p. 628).  
While making an effort to offer an area for consensus with the claim for 
universality and cultural relativism (or pluralism), he aims to emphasize that any 
form of development ethics theory must be in a universalistic framework which also 
considers the pluralism of human values, different cultures, religions and habits. 
Hence, the combination of universalism and pluralism is central to Sen’s analysis. 
Nevertheless, Sen (1993) definitely refuses to accept a definite Nussbaum list 
of capabilities and hence an attempt to line the Aristotelian link to the capability 
approach in terms of “definite list of good life”
1. Sen himself lists some reasons why 
he does not agree to draw a definite list of human needs
2. But mostly his 
intransigence arises from the consideration that the deliberate incompleteness of the 
capability approach permits other routes to be taken which also have some 
plausibility (Sen 1993, p. 47). 
                                                        
1 Aristotle believes, as Nussbaum notes, “that there is just one list of functionings (at least at a certain 
level of generality) that do in fact constitute human good living”. 
2 As Yamamori stated, perhaps Sen wanted to avoid the almost violent connotations of the process of 
“listing-up” criteria and in this sense Sen is more critically universalistic than Nussbaum. This direction 
for being sensitive to people’s differences has been termed by many scholars as constructive universalism 
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2.6 Predictability and Verifiability  
 
Positivism and the prestige of 17
th and 18
th scientism and especially of Newtonian 
physics are mainly responsible for bringing about the linear paradigm which was 
founded on four golden rules: (1) reductionism, (2) order, (3) determinism, and (4) 
predictability and verifibiality. 
The first rule implies that the behavior of a system can be understood, 
clockwork fashion, by observing the behaviors of its parts. There are no surprises; 
the whole is the sum of the parts, no more and no less. We have analysed this golden 
rule, namely reductionism, under the analyses of methodological individualism.  
While the rule of order means that given causes lead to known effects at all 
times and places, the rule of determinism implies that processes flow along orderly 
and predictable paths that have clear beginnings and rational ends. In this study, we 
have also analysed both of them under universalism. 
On the other hand, predictability means that once global behavior is defined, 
the future course of events can be predicted by the application of appropriate inputs 
to the model. Sen especially criticizes the positivist and instrumentalist perspectives 
of mainstream economists. Within this understanding, the notions of efficiency, 
calculability, predictability and control are dominant factors in explaining the 
development process of both developing and developed countries. Sen criticizes the 
narrowness of the prediction and calculation-centred methodological approach and 
argues that there are other exercises as important as predictive-calculative theories, 
such as providing adequate description.  
Prediction is undoubtedly a major exercise in economics, but an overconcen-
tration on this one function can lead to undue neglect of other exercises –for exam-
ple, doing economic evaluation or providing adequate description. For this case, Sen 
gives an example that descriptive statements such as “unemployment has increased” 
or “inflation is slowing down” call for some way of assessing the reality of what is 
occurring. They are primarily concerned with reflecting adequately what has hap-
pened rather than with foretelling what will happen or what would have happened 
had the circumstances been different (Sen 2004, p. 584). 
The issue of testing and verification are also important for many types of 
economic analyses. Sen (1991) argued that since most economic analyses involve 
causal relationships, economists have to analyse this relationship systematically. 
Inquiring the need of the variability in economic theory, Sen (2004) explicitly 
declares that it is not necessary. According to him, the point has often been made that 
many economic theories are hard to test, and sometimes they are not testable even in 
principle. This recognition is frequently seen as the basis of justified skepticism re-
garding the value of such theories. For him, a great deal of economic theory 
involving causal relationships is, in fact, of this kind, and the practical value of 
insights obtained from analytical reasoning may well be very substantial (Sen 2004, 
p. 585). Hence as far as causal theories are concerned, the need to test them with 
empirical information is fairly universally accepted in principle by economic 
theorists.  
Although Sen criticized the strict positivist-linear paradigm in explaining 
economic and social reality, Sen (2002) also refrained from the relativist-pluralistic 96  Hatice Karaçay Çakmak 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2010, 1, pp. 85-99 
paradigm. In other words, Sen takes a middle position between the two apparently 
extreme paradigms. 
 
2.7 The Idea of Freedom 
 
In the old classical liberal philosophy, while savings and ownership rights were the 
main focus in the determination of individual freedoms, the state was mainly viewed 
as an institution which protects these rights of the individuals. In other words, for old 
classical liberal philosophy, freedom refers to the absence of interference; this type 
of freedom is also called negative freedom. The concept of negative freedom is also 
used by mainstream economists
3 as the absence of coercion and interference by 
others, and specifically as the absence of government “interference” in the market. 
This is often the meaning given to “free market”: it is a “freedom-from”; a freedom 
from constraints on one’s choices in markets, leaving producers and consumers Free 
to Choose, as indicated in the book of that title by M. Friedman & R. Friedman 
(Gasper and Irene van Staveren 2003, p. 139). For Friedman as well as other 
mainstream economists, human freedom and economic freedom work together and 
redistributive action by the government is interpreted as coercive intervention in the 
life of an individual.  
Freedom is one of the most important concept of Sen’s analyses. Sen (1999, 
2002) has consistently placed freedom to achieve (capability) as the central category 
of his analysis. As noted in the previous section, Sen refers to the “positive concept 
of freedom” in his studies, stating how freedom should be viewed as both “the 
primary end” and the “principal means” of development and he criticized its use in a 
negative manner. It is not necessary to re-explain the importance of the concept of 
positive freedom in this section. However, it is necessary to emphasize the link 
between individual freedom and social arrangement. Sen (1999, p. xii) emphasizes 
the importance of social arrangements in achieving freedom of agency. According to 
him, since there is a deep
 complementarity between individual agency and social 
arrangements,
 it is important to give simultaneous recognition to the centrality
 of 
individual freedom and to the force of social influences
 on the extent and reach of 
individual freedom. Hence to counter the
 problems individual freedom should be 
considered as




The main characteristic of the capability approach is its focus on doings and beings 
and the freedom to achieve them, instead of the goods and resources that people can 
                                                        
3 The negative concept of
 freedom which was also traced by mainstream economists goes back at least to 
Hobbes. The positive concept,
 on the other hand, has been associated with Rousseau, Kant and
 Hegel and 
more generally with socialist writers. Although Sen emphasize the importance of social arrangements in 
accessing freedom, there are some important differences between Sen’s analysis and communitarian and 
socialist writers’ analysis. Sen's emphasis on individual freedom has led to concerns that
 he failed to take 
sufficient account of the social nature
 of freedom as emphasized by Hegel and Marx and, in more recent
 
times, by communitarians such as Charles Taylor (Renee Prendergast 2005, p. 1158). Since Sen 
discussed “positive freedom” within the liberal framework, his stance on the social nature of freedom is 
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access or possess. According to this approach, human beings have to be given the 
opportunity to shape their own destiny rather than be the passive recipients of 
externally devised development projects like the westernization project that was 
designed by mainstream economics. Regarding this statement, it could easily be 
noted that the capability approach and mainstream economics display fairly 
discordant structures. The main reason for this discord is that these two analyses are 
grounded on considerably different microeconomic foundations of macro economics 
and hence methodological/ epistemological roots. 
The capability approach and mainstream economics are incompatible in their 
viewpoints of the dominant methodologies in the social sciences. While the 
capability approach is based on non-Cartesian epistemological roots that lead to a 
recognition of knowledge as socially constructed, mainstream economics has 
essentially adopted Cartesianism and the doctrine of Newtonian atomism that lead to 
a recognition of formalism, predictiability, verifiability, linearism, methodological 
individualism. 
Political, economical and cultural extensions of the Enlightenment and 
classical liberal philosophy based on Cartesian epistemological roots have also 
increased the conflict between these two analyses. Since Sen criticizes any form of 
rough universalism which does not consider the differences between and among 
cultures and he questions whether it is correct to classify self-interest as the only 
motivation, rather than one of many motivations. Since he rejects the negative type 
of freedom which goes back to Hobbes, it can be explicitly stated that Sen does not 
recognize nor internalize unhesitantly all the ideas of the Enlightenment and classical 
liberal philosophy. 
In conclusion, it should also be stated that while Sen rejects the main political, 
cultural and economical implications of classical liberal philosophy and the main 
metholodological/epistemological roots of mainstream economics, he has never 
challenged the ontological foundations of mainstream economics and liberal 
philosophy. This distinction is of crosscutting importance, precisely because the “in-
dividual” focus of the capability approach is often misunderstood or inaccurately 
criticized. Although the capability approach offers an alternative approach within the 
frame of epistemological/ methodological grounds, it also strongly defends individu-
alism ontologically. For this approach, individuals, and only individuals, are the ul-
timate units of concern. As Robeyns (2003) states, this, of course, does not imply that 
it should not evaluate social structures and societal properties, but it strongly implies 
that these structures and institutions will be evaluated in virtue of the causal impor-
tance that they have for individuals’ “well-being”. On the other hand, since the onto-
logical break of the approach is not currently our research theme, we have not dis-
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